Co-operative Credit Delinquency: Identification of Factors Discriminating Defaulters by Justin, Nelson Michael
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Co-operative Credit Delinquency:
Identification of Factors Discriminating
Defaulters
Nelson Michael Justin
Kristu Jayanti College, Bangalore
3. November 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37480/
MPRA Paper No. 37480, posted 21. March 2012 13:13 UTC
  
CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT DELINQUENCY: IDENTIFICATION 
OF FACTORS DISCRIMINATING DEFAULTERS 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr. JUSTIN NELSON MICHAEL 
 
 
 
 
 
MBA Department 
KRISTU JAYANTI COLLEGE 
K. Narayanapura 
Kothanur PO 
Bangalore - 560077 
 
 
Email: nelson@kristujayanti.com 
Nelz.jm@gmail.com 
 
1 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Co-operative movement dawned in India a century ago to eradicate 
indebtedness and to accelerate agricultural production in India. Co-operatives are 
eminently suited to achieve social, economic changes in rural India. However, credit 
risk is acute in co-operative credit system, predominantly manifested in short-term 
credit. Delinquency of co-operative credit is the object of enquiry  for many 
committees and researches. Mounting overdues at the level of Primary Agricultural 
Co-operative Banks (PACB) contribute to the accumulation of Non-performing 
Assets (NPA) in the Central Co-operative Banks (CCB). Willful default has been  
identified as the main reason for mounting overdues. This empirical study of 
defaulters of co-operative credit has examined the factors discriminating default of 
co-operative credit, which subsequently increase NPA. Univariate Analysis and 
Discriminant Function analysis was carried out to identify the factors. Such  
identification of factors discriminating credit default is crucial to reduce credit 
delinquency in co-operative credit system. 
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CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT DELINQUENCY: IDENTIFICATION OF 
FACTORS DISCRIMINATING DEFAULTERS 
Co-operative Banking 
The co-operative movement dawned in India a century ago to eradicate the 
indebtedness of the people and to accelerate the pace of agricultural production in 
India.  Co-operative credit system has been recognized as the most suitable system to 
rejuvenate the economic fabric of rural India. “It may be regarded as axiomatic that at 
the rural base, no form of credit organization will be sustainable except the co-
operative credit society”(RBI 1954, p.199).  The co-operatives are eminently suited to 
achieve the desired social, economic changes in rural India (GOI 1997, p. 76)  Co-
operative credit system is suited at the rural base due to local participation, democratic 
management and responsiveness to local needs” (GOI, 1972, p. 173). Co-operative 
credit system in India follows a three tier system. The State Co-operative Banks at the 
state level, the Central Co-operative Banks (CCB) at the district level and the Primary 
Agricultural Co-operative Banks (PACB) at the village level.  
Credit Risk in Co-operative Banks 
Banking business is exposed to various risks such as credit risk, liquidity risk, 
interest risk, market risk, operational risk, and management risk.  But, credit risk 
stands out as the most detrimental of them all (Iyer, 1999).  The risk of erosion in 
asset value due to simple default or non-payment of dues by the borrowers is credit 
risk or default risk (Sarma, 1996).  Credit risk is acute in CCBs, since they are the 
important vessels of priority sector lending, through their member PACBs.  One of 
the important limitations of the federal character of co-operative credit structure is 
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that the working of primary societies undermines the capacity of the organization at  
the immediate higher level to work actively (Rao, 1981). This problem is manifested 
more in the field of short-term co-operative credit.  Heavy overdues at the primary 
level turn the societies dormant, creating a difficult situation for central banks to 
channel fresh credit (Puyalvanan, 1998).  The Non performing Assets (NPA) level in 
the CCBs increases simultaneously. When the resources deployed by the CCBs and 
PACBs are locked up as NPAs and overdues respectively, the credit agencies are 
impaired from obtaining refinance from the apex lending agencies. Their capacity to 
undertake fresh lending is impaired, adding woe to the existing resource constraints 
(RBI, 1989). The lending capacity of the banks is adversely affected due to their 
inability to recycle the resources (Murty and Durga, 1998) or to raise more resources 
from higher financing agencies.  Any liquidity crisis in co-operative banks will 
subsequently hinder capital formation in agriculture, which will decelerate economic 
development, (Georgekutty, 2000) since they play a major role in rural lending. As a 
defaulter, the borrower is cut-off from any access to credit from institutions.  The 
borrower’s productive enterprise is affected.  A much higher price has to be paid for 
any informal source of credit.  Thus,   the agriculturist and other related enterprises 
suffer on account of non-availability of adequate credit supply for investment and 
working capital.  Specifically, NPAs affect profitability, liquidity, and solvency of the 
bank.  Continuous decline in profitability due to increase in NPAs would ultimately 
jeopardize the viability of the bank.  Hence, it is imperative to curb overdues at the 
primary level.  Delinquency of co-operative credit is due to default, both non-willful 
and willful.  However, willful default is identified as the main reason for mounting 
overdues (RBI, 1981).   Hence, a probe into the factors discriminating default would 
enable the reduction of overdues at the primary level, and NPAs at the CCB Level. 
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Default of Co-operative Credit 
   Delinquency of co-operative credit is the object of enquiry for many 
Committees and researches. These studies are replete with empirical information and 
methodological rigour. RBI (1974) estimated that more than three – fourths of the 
overdues were due to willful default.      Dadhich (1977) found that the main causes for 
willful default were re-lending practices, which enabled to make profit out of the 
interest margins. The RBI conducted a special study in 1978, which made it clear that 
the accumulation of overdues was largely due to willful default and partly due to 
irregular lending, lack of supervision, indifferent recovery efforts, inaction against 
defaulters, unnecessary interference of State Governments in the recovery of the 
credit, domination by the vested interest of politicians and the elite. RBI (1981) while 
endorsing the findings of the Study Team on Overdues found that in many cases the 
default was willful and that too it was by the big farmers. Kalyankar (1983) in his 
study on crop loan overdues of co-operative finance revealed that 60% of the 
overdues were from 27% of the big farmers who had the capacity to repay but had 
neither the will nor the intention to do so. Balishter, Singh and Viswajit (1994), in 
their study in Agra District, found out that willful default was mainly confined to 
medium and large farmers to the extent of over 90 percent. Singh and Rawat (1999) 
predicted the default status of crop loan defaulters in Hamirpur district.  The relative 
importance of the variables, viz., operational size of holding, initial amount of loan, 
gross income from agriculture, family consumption expenditure, in regard to their 
power to discriminate between the willful and non-willful defaulters was known. 
Ravichandran (2000) in his study in Tamil Nadu concluded that political exploitation 
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became the major cause for delinquency, compared to other causes for overdues, viz., 
crop failures, increasing family expenditure, and social obligations. A significant 
portion of defaulters were of the opinion that Government waiving schemes was the 
major cause for this delinquency. Das (2002) unveiled that improper utilization of 
loan and the insignificant repayment behavior had stood on the way of the 
development process of rural sector. 
Methodology 
This is an analytical study based on primary  data. The primary data used was 
collected from sample respondents who were defaulters of co-operative credit.  Data 
was collected by means of a pre-tested, structured interview schedule.  The data so 
collected regarding loan details, overdues, default period, land holding, cultivation, 
etc. were counter-verified with the assistance of PACB officials.  The details 
regarding farm income and expenditure were verified with the officials of the 
department of agriculture and district level averages from the Department of 
Economics and Statistics.   
 The study focuses on default of co-operative credit in Cuddalore Dist, Tamil 
Nadu.  Since the level of short-term NPAs has been high, and CCBs do not finance 
short-term credit directly, and sample defaulters of sample PACBs have been studied. 
A multi-stage sampling procedure was adopted.  Cuddalore district in Tamil Nadu has 
Cuddalore, Chidambaram, Panruti, Kattumannarkoil, Vriddhachalam, and Tittakudi 
taluks.   Based on the recovery performance, the taluks were  classified as taluks with 
high level of recovery (average rate of recovery above 90%), moderate recovery (75% 
to 90% recovery) and low level of recovery (recovery of less than 75%) respectively.  
From each category, one taluk was selected. Chidambaram, where recovery is low, 
Kattumannarkoil with moderate recovery and Cuddalore with high level of  recovery 
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were the taluks selected for the study. There are a number of member PACBs of the 
bank.  From each taluk two  PACBs were selected.  Thus, 6 PACBs were chosen from 
a population of 166 PACBs. PACBs maintain a register of default accounts.  From the 
population of defaulters in the selected PACBs, 40 respondents were selected from 
each of the PACB, randomly with the help of Tippet’s  Table of Random Numbers.  
Thus, 240 respondents were chosen from the 6 PACBs representing the 3 taluks of the 
district. Chi- square test and Discriminant function analysis was used.   
Identification of willful defaulters  
 The term ‘willful default’ means default of the debts when it is within the 
capacity of the borrower to repay but is not repaid.    Liquidity and marketable surplus 
method
  
(Dadhich, 1977, Toor, 1998, Ravichandran, 2000) was used to identify wilful 
defaulters. According to this method, repayment capacity means excess of income 
over expenditure.  
Factors Discriminating Default (Univariate Analysis) 
Various committees which studied co-operative credit and various researches, 
have concluded that willful default is the principal reason for mounting overdues in 
co-operatives.  Overdues in PACBs subsequently increase the level of NPAs in CCBs.  
                The factors which discriminate defaulters, were probed. Various socio-
economic, agro-economic and credit factors that could discriminate defaulters were 
studied through univariate analysis.  Table  1 categorizes the defaulters on the basis of 
these factors.    The following variables were identified as significant variables using 
chi square test through univariate analysis - social grouping, predominant occupation, 
landholding, amount borrowed, overdues, utilization, annual income, annual 
expenditure, type of  crop, market surplus and expectation of waiver. 
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i. While 59% of the forward caste defaulters were willful, a majority of the 
defaulters in the other caste groups were non-willful.  
ii. Among the willful defaulters 58.1% of them did not have agriculture as their 
predominant occupation and among non-willful defaulters 60.7% had 
agriculture as their predominant occupation.   
iii. A simple majority i.e., 56.39% and 55.14% of the non-leaders and leaders 
were non-willful defaulters.  The rest were willful defaulters. 
iv. About 86.2% of the marginal farmers and 56.9% of the small farmers were 
non-willful defaulters.  But 77.6% of the large farmers and 51.9% of medium 
farmers were willful defaulters A majority of large farmers were willful 
defaulters but a majority of marginal farmers were non-willful defaulters.  
v. While 60.9% of willful defaulters had overdues of L 20,001 and L 30,000, 
72.9% of the non-willful defaulters had overdues of less than L10,000.  While 
62.9% of defaulters who had used the loan fully for the specified purpose were 
willful, 59.1% of those who had used it partially were non-willful. The non-
willful defaulters formed majority of the two groups who had diverted loans to 
various unproductive purposes. It was seen that 70.3% of those who had used 
loans for domestic consumption were non-willful defaulters and 60% who had 
diverted loans start other businesses were non-willful.   
vi. The wilful default status was higher in the higher income groups.   
vii. Among those cultivating only food crops, 60.1% were non-willful and among 
those cultivating only commercial crops, 75% were willful.    
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viii. The willful default status was high with those who had more marketable 
surplus. It was seen that 88.6% of those with market surplus of above L 
1,00,001 were willful defaulters.   
ix. While 62.5% of those expecting waiver were non-willful, the two groups were 
equally distributed with regard to non-expectation.   
 
Factors Discriminating Defaulters (Discriminant Function Analysis)  
 Discriminant function analysis can be used to predict to what extent a 
borrower of co-operative credit would default wilfully  or non-willfully.  An 
understanding of these factors would help predict default and subsequently willful 
default.  The bank could use these factors to predict the repayment behaviour of the 
members thereby preventing default and willful default.  The following variables 
which were identified as significant variables through univariate analysis were chosen 
for discriminant function analysis - social grouping, predominant occupation, 
landholding, amount borrowed, overdues, utilization, annual income, annual 
expenditure, type of  crop, market surplus and expectation of waiver.  The stepwise 
discriminant function analysis was carried out.  In the first step of analysis, the 
variable annual income was taken up by the program.  In the  second step annual 
expenditure was taken.  Landholding and amount of overdues were considered in the 
third and fourth steps respectively. 
 The unstandardized discriminant function coefficients estimated are shown in 
Table 2a. The group centroids based on unstandardized canonical discriminant 
functions evaluated at group means are indicated in Table 2b. With these coefficients,  
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it is possible to predict whether a borrower is a willful defaulter or  
a non-willful defaulter.  
The significant variables considered for the analysis were coded as follows: 
a)  Landholding was coded as: marginal farmer (1), small farmer (2), medium 
farmer (3), and larger farmer (4)  
b) Annual income was coded as: less than L 50,000 (1), L 50,001–1,00,000 (2), 
above L 1,00,001 (3) 
c)  Annual expenditure was coded as: less than L50,000 (1), L50,001–1,00,000 
(2), above L 1,00,001 (3) 
d) Amount of overdues was coded as: less than L 10,000 (1), L 10,001–20,000 
(2), L 20,001–30,000 (3), L 30,001– 40,000 (4), above L 40,001 (5). 
 Let us assume the case of a large landholder (as per coding – 4) with an annual 
expenditure of L 50,001-1,00,000 (as per coding – 2) annual income above L 1,00,001 
(as per coding – 3) has overdues between L10,001–20,000  
(as per coding – 2).   
We can predict his / her default status thus, using the coefficients, 
Default status = (-) 1.869 + 0.452 (Land – 4) – 1.162 (expenditure   
                                   – 2) + 1.887 (income – 3) – 0.276 (overdues – 2) 
                             =   2.724 
Since the calculated value is more than zero (positive), based on the group 
centroid, we can predict the defaulter to be willful.   
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Further, the model was tested and the classification results are shown in Table 
2c. The result indicates that 76.7% of the cases were correctly predicted by the 
discriminant function analysis. Therefore, the annual income, landholding, annual 
expenditure, and overdues were the four significant  variables that could discriminate 
the defaulters as willful or non-willful. 
Conclusion 
 The CCBs play a significant role in the economy of Tamil Nadu. But the 
increase in the credit disbursed through them was dampened by mounting gross 
NPAs.    Three-fourth of the NPAs were short-term.  Since short-term NPAs occupied 
a bulk of the NPAs, the study of default of co-operative credit in the PACBs in the 
district identified factors like annual income, landholding, annual expenditure and 
overdues as significant in discriminating between willful and non-willful defaulters.  
Stringent measures to control  and prevent NPAs besides effective credit monitoring  
and use of effective execution of decrees besides various avenues of recovery, 
especially compromise settlements would contain the problem of NPAs effectively. 
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Table 1 
Factors Discriminating Defaulters 
 
 
 
Variables 
Defaulters Calculated 
χ
2
 Value 
P 
Value Willful N = 105 
Non-willful 
N = 134 
Total 
N  = 240 
1. Taluk    
0.413 0.814 
       Chidambaram 33 (41.3) 
47 
(58.8) 
80 
(100) 
        Kattumannarkoil 36 (45) 
44 
(55) 
80 
(100) 
        Cuddalore 37 (46.3) 
43 
(53.8) 
80 
(100) 
2. Age    
4.291 0.232 
        Below 30 years 13 (32.5) 
27 
(67.5) 
40 
(100) 
        31-40 years 38 (51.4) 
36 
(48.6) 
74 
(100) 
        41-50 years 36 (46.2) 
42 
(53.8) 
78 
(100) 
        Above 51 years 19 (39.6) 
29 
(60.4) 
48 
(100) 
3. Education    
8.300 0.217 
        College 23 (60.5) 
15 
(39.5) 
38 
(100) 
        Higher Secondary 15 (37.5) 
25 
(62.5) 
40 
(100) 
        High School 27 (47.4) 
30 
(52.6) 
57 
(100) 
        Elementary  22 (36.1) 
39 
(63.9) 
61 
(100) 
        No formal education 19 (43.2) 
25 
(%6.8) 
44 
(100) 
4. Social Grouping    
10.275 0.006 
        Forward Caste 46 (%9.0) 
32 
(41.0) 
78 
(100) 
        Backward Caste 33 (37.1) 
56 
(62.9) 
89 
(100) 
        SC/ST 27 (37.0) 
46 
(63.0) 
73 
(100) 
5. No. of Dependents    
0.706 0.702 
        0 13 (43.33) 
17 
(56.67) 
30 
(100) 
        1-3 70 (46.05) 
82 
(53.95) 
152 
(100) 
        4-7 23 (39.66) 
35 
(60.34) 
58 
(100) 
6. Predominant Occupation    
6.548 0.011         Agriculture 
70 
(39.3) 
108 
(60.7) 
178 
(100) 
        Others 36 (58.1) 
26 
(41.9) 
62 
(100) 
7. Leadership     
0.846 0.475         Non-leader 
58 
(43.61) 
75 
(56.39) 
133 
(100) 
        Leader 48 (44.86) 
59 
(55.14) 
107 
(100) 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
 
Variables 
Defaulters 
Calculated 
χ
2
 Value 
P 
Value 
Willful 
N = 105 
Non-willful 
N = 134 
Total 
N  = 240 
8. Landholding    
47.708 <0.001 
       Marignal 9 (13.8) 
56 
(86.2) 
65 
(100) 
        Small 31 (43.1) 
41 
(56.9) 
72 
(100) 
        Medium 28 (51.9) 
26 
(48.1) 
54 
(100) 
        Large 38 (77.6) 
11 
(22.4) 
49 
(100) 
9. Amount Borrowed    
8.689 0.069 
        Less than L10000 7 (23.3) 
23 
(76.7) 
30 
(100) 
     L. 10001 – 20000 39 (41.1) 
56 
(58.9) 
95 
(100) 
     L. 20001 – 30000 24 (53.3) 
21 
(46.7) 
45 
(100) 
     L. 30001 – 40000 13 (52.0) 
12 
(48.0) 
25 
(100) 
        Above L. 40001 23 (51.1) 
22 
(48.9) 
45 
(100) 
10. Overdues    
12.329 0.015 
        Less than L 10000 9 (27.3) 
24 
(72.7) 
33 
(100) 
        L 10001 – 20000 41 (38.0) 
67 
(62.0) 
108 
(100) 
      L. 20001 – 30000 28 (60.9) 
18 
(39.1) 
46 
(100) 
        L. 30001 – 40000 12 (52.2) 
11 
(47.8) 
23 
(100) 
        Above L 40001 16 (53.3) 
14 
(46.7) 
30 
(100) 
11. Period    
6.166 0.104 
        Less than 1 years 18 (60.0) 
12 
(40.0) 
30 
(100) 
        1-3 years 66 (45.5) 
79 
(54.5) 
145 
(100) 
        3-6 years 18 (35.3) 
33 
(6.7) 
51 
(100) 
        Above 6 years 4 (28.6) 
10 
(71.4) 
14 
(100) 
12. Borrowings from other sources    
6.166 0.104         No 
49 
(47.6) 
54 
(52.4) 
103 
(100) 
        Yes 57 (41.6) 
80 
(59.4) 
137 
(100) 
13. Utilization    
5.811 0.016         Full 
22 
(62.9) 
13 
(37.1) 
35 
(100) 
        Partial 84 (41) 
121 
(59.1) 
205 
(100) 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
 
Variables 
Defaulters 
Calculated 
χ
2
 Value 
P 
Value 
Willful 
N = 105 
Non-willful 
N = 134 
Total 
N  = 240 
14. Diversiona    
2.726 0.742 
       i. Re-lending 14 (42.4) 
19 
(57.6) 
33 
(100) 
        ii. Repayment of old debts 39 (43.3) 
51 
(56.7) 
90 
(100) 
        iii. Domestic consumption 11 (29.7) 
26 
(70.3) 
37 
(100) 
        iv. Business / Profession 8 (40.0) 
12 
(60.3) 
20 
(100) 
        v. Ceremonies 6 (50.0) 
6 
(50.0) 
12 
(100) 
        vi. Medical 6 (46.2) 
7 
(53.8) 
13 
(100) 
15. Annual Income    
66.162 <0.001 
        Less than L 50000 14 (16.5) 
71 
(83.5) 
85 
(100) 
        L 50001 – 100000 35 (4.2) 
50 
(58.8) 
85 
(100) 
        Above L 100001 57 (81.4) 
13 
(18.6) 
70 
(100) 
16. Annual Expenditure    
6.051 0.049 
        Less than L 50000 30 (34.88) 
56 
(65.12) 
86 
(100) 
        L 50001 – 100000 50 (46.30) 
58 
(53.70) 
108 
(100) 
        Above L 100001 26 (56.52) 
20 
(43.48) 
46 
(100) 
17. Type of crop    
5.895 0.052 
        Food crops 55 (39.9) 
83 
(60.1) 
138 
(100) 
        Commercial crops 9 (75.0) 
3 
(25.0) 
12 
(100) 
        Both 42 (46.7) 
48 
(53.3) 
90 
(100) 
18. Market surplus    
52.82 <0.001 
        Less than R L 50000 32 (25.8) 
92 
(74.2) 
124 
(100) 
        L 50001 – 100000 35 (48.6) 
37 
(51.4) 
72 
(100) 
        Above L 100001 39 (88.6) 
5 
(11.4) 
42 
(100) 
19. Waiver    
3.785 0.052         Expecting 
42 
(37.5) 
70 
(62.5) 
112 
(100) 
        Not expecting 64 (50.0) 
64 
(50.0) 
1.28 
(100) 
 
    Source :    Primary Data 
    Note     :    a Only 205 respondents diverted the loans (Chidambaram – 65, Kattumannarkoil – 77,  
                     Cuddalore – 63) 
Figures in parentheses indicate percentage to total 
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Table 2a 
Unstandardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
Variables Function (1) 
Landholding 0.452 
Annual Expenditure -1.162 
Annual Income 1.887 
Overdues -0.276 
Constant -1.869 
 
Source : Computed from Primary Data 
 
Table 2b 
Unstandardized Canonical Discriminant Functions at Group Centroidsa 
 
Default Status Function (1) 
Willful 0.909 
Non-willful -0.719 
 
Source : Computed from Primary Data 
Note   : 
a
Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluated at   
               group means 
 
 
Table 2c 
Classification Results of Canonical Discriminant Analysisa 
 
Default Status Predicted Group Membership Total Willful Non-willful 
Original Count 
Willful 
        Non-Willful 
 
76 
26 
 
30 
108 
 
106 
134 
Percentage  
Willful 
       Non-willful 
 
71.7 
19.4 
 
28.3 
80.6 
 
100.0 
100.0 
 
Source : Computed from Primary Data 
Note : 
a
76.7% of original  group cases are correctly classified 
 
